The intangible material of interactive art:agency, behavior and emergence by Soler-Adillon, Joan
A UOC scientific e-journalArtnodes, no. 16 (2015) I ISSN 1695-5951
2015 by FUOCCC
E-JOURNAL ON ART, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
artnodes
http://artnodes.uoc.edu
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
Abstract
This paper presents a conceptual analysis of some of the basic notions for the practice of 
interactive art and the relations among them. A sound understanding of these notions is 
essential for the creation of the aesthetics of artistically behaving systems. Interactivity, agency, 
behavior and emergence are presented as the building blocks of this practice, understanding 
that they are at least as important as the materials that physically instantiate the pieces and 
installations that constitute the body of interactive art. Interactivity is defined and confronted to 
the metaphor of the conversation and to the idea of designing interactive systems with artistic 
purposes. The notions of agency, behavior and performativity are reviewed through the reading 
of Andrew Pickering’s account for the ontology of Cybernetics and in relation to interactive art 
practices. Finally, the concept of emergence and Peter Cariani’s emergence-relative-to-a-model 
are presented as a theoretical framework with which the analysis and creation of unexpected 
and non pre-designed behaviors in interactive systems can be based. 
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El material intangible del arte interactivo: agencia,  
comportamiento y emergencia
Resumen
Este artículo presenta un análisis conceptual de algunas de las nociones básicas para la práctica 
del arte interactivo y las relaciones entre estas. Un buen conocimiento de estas nociones es 
fundamental para la creación de la estética de los sistemas con un comportamiento artístico. 
La interactividad, la agencia, el comportamiento y la emergencia se presentan como los pilares 
fundamentales de esta práctica, entendiendo que son como mínimo tan importantes como 
los materiales que físicamente instancian los componentes e instalaciones que constituyen 
el cuerpo del arte interactivo. La interactividad se define y confronta con la metáfora de la 
conversación y la idea del diseño de sistemas interactivos con fines artísticos. Las nociones de 
agencia, comportamiento y performatividad se revisan a través de la lectura de la interpretación 
de Andrew Pickering para la ontología de la cibernética y en relación con las prácticas artísticas 
interactivas. Por último, el concepto de emergencia y la emergencia relativa a un modelo de 
Peter Cariani se presentan como un marco teorético en el que se puede basar el análisis y la 
creación de comportamientos inesperados y no diseñados previamente en sistemas interactivos. 
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1. Introduction
This paper presents a conceptual analysis of some of the basic 
notions for the practice of interactive art and of its relation. A sound 
understanding of these notions is essential for the creation of the 
aesthetics of artistically behaving systems. Interactivity, agency, 
behavior and emergence are presented as the building blocks of 
this practice, understanding that they are at least as important as 
the materials that physically instantiate the pieces and installations 
that constitute its body of work.
Interactive art materializes in computer screens, installation 
spaces, robotic devices and the like. The interactor (the one who 
dialogues with the piece) relates with it through sensor interfaces: 
keyboard, mouse, proximity sensors, customized buttons, etc. and 
is addressed through actuators: loudspeakers, screens, motors, 
etc. All of these materially instantiated elements are certainly a 
part of the interactive experience, and it is through them that the 
artistic experience is brought about. In addition, more often than 
not, interactive art pieces are characterized through these elements: 
categories such as net.art, installation art or robotic art are examples 
of this. 
However, the choosing of components and the designed interfaces 
is only a part of the creative endeavor of interactive art. Arguably, what 
is essential to this practice is precisely that which is not physically 
instantiated, even in robotic pieces. Agency and behavior, which 
form the basis of performativity, are instead the defining and very 
central aspects of interactive art. They are the intangible material of 
interactive art. In this context, the concept of emergence appears 
as an essential piece in order to understand the possibility of non 
pre-defined behaviors to appear in such pieces. 
2. Interactivity
There is a body of literature that has addressed the definition of 
interactivity in relation to both general and computer media, mostly 
since the mid-late 1990s. The general consensus is that there are 
three main approaches to defining the concept from the media studies 
point of view, depending on whether the defining efforts situate the 
focus of the definition on the structure of media, on the user, or on 
the process of communication that develops between them (Downes 
and McMillan, 2000; Kiousis, 2002; Quiring, 2009; Mechant, 2012; 
Weber, Behr and DeMartino, 2014). 
A first group of authors is that which focuses on interactivity as 
a characteristic of media (Durlak, 1987; Baecker and Buxton, 1988; 
Wilson, 1994; Jensen, 1998; 1999; 2008; Sundar, 2004; Lee, Park 
and Jin, 2006). The center of interest within these approaches is on 
how media is structured in order to afford interactivity: what it offers 
to the potential user and how, so that interaction can take place. 
Interactivity is often presented in these cases as a continuum, and 
different media are placed in different points along that continuum 
(from less interactive to more interactive media). The types of activities 
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that each of these media offer to users is also read within these 
parameters. On the other end, some authors place the focus of study 
on the user, mainly around the concept of perceived interaction (Wu 
1999; Liu and Shrum, 2002; Leiner and Quiring, 2008; Quiring 2009). 
What is most important here is what interactivity means for the person 
that uses the interactive system and how he or she relates to media 
on its terms. Interactivity here is an information-based process that is 
relevant in terms of individual perception (Newhagen, 2004). Finally, 
there is a third group of authors that center their approach on the 
communicational process that interactivity represents (Kiousis, 2002; 
Rafaeli, 1988; Rafaeli and Sundweeks, 1997; Crawford, 2003; Noble 
2009; Penny 2000; 2011; Green, 2010). The focus in these cases is 
on the process that develops as the interactive system and the user 
act and react to one another. 
I have defined interactivity as “a series of related actions between 
two or more agents where (1) at least one of them is an artificial 
system that (2) processes its responses according to a behavior 
specified by design and (3) takes into account some of the previous 
actions executed by them” (Soler-Adillon, 2015). This definition aims 
not at trying to solve the everlasting discussion on how to define the 
term but at clarifying the concept in the context of interactive art. 
The definition addresses the three main aspects that should be taken 
into account when trying to frame such a complex concept within a 
particular context:1 first, specify the system under analysis (ie, are 
we analyzing the computer as a whole, for instance, or a particular 
piece of software?); second, analyze what the system is capable of 
doing (ie, how it responds to its environment); third, following one 
of the classic definitions of the term (Rafaeli, 1988), discern if these 
responses are merely reactive or are a case of interactivity in terms 
of acknowledgement of already performed actions.
This definition corresponds to the third category mentioned above. 
It aims at clarifying the communicational process of interactivity, and 
it understands it in terms of design and functionality, not of subjective 
experience by the user or interactor. The point of view for the analysis 
is on how the systems are designed in order to respond to the users’ 
actions in a way that is read as interactive; on the process of dialogue 
that is created between the behaving system and the human interactor 
and not on the subjective experience of the latter.
Within this discussion, the metaphor of the conversation is 
useful: the dialogue between the human and the machine that 
inspired Cybernetics and that is the foundation of Human-Computer 
Interaction. After all, the idea is that computers exchange information 
with users, as the back and forth of messages advances. User does, 
computer reacts, then user does again in response to this reaction, 
and so on and so forth. This conversation can be understood in a 
very simplistic manner, in terms of the control of systems where 
the artificial system responds to the commands of a human user, or 
with a more ambitious interpretation of the metaphor, which aims at 
generating, through the interactive system, a series of meaningful 
exchanges.
Gordon Pask’s Conversation Theory is an important effort to 
theorize this (Pask, 1975; 1976; 1996), although it is a general 
theory not specifically centered on man/machine conversation. Pask’s 
writings on the subject find its context in his interest in learning 
devices. Conversation is in his work presented – and interpreted by 
latter authors – as an advanced form of interaction by systems that 
have the ability to learn. More recently, Paul Pangaro has elaborated 
on Conversation Theory in relation to social media and design 
(Pangaro, 2009; Dubberly and Pangaro, 2009) and to relevant models 
of interactivity (Dubberly, Pangaro and Haque, 2009). Following Pask, 
Pangaro and colleagues understand that conversing systems are 
a sophisticated assemblage of (second-order cybernetic) learning 
systems that feed on and react to each other. This conversation is, 
according to them, the most elaborate form of interaction.
In an effort to differentiate systems that are merely reactive 
from those that afford interactivity, Dubberly, Panagaro and Haque 
distinguish among static, dynamic-reactive, and dynamic-interactive 
systems. The first are systems that “cannot act and thus have little 
or no meaningful effect on their environment (a chair, for example)”. 
Dynamic systems do have the ability to act and relate to their 
environment. Within those, they distinguish between systems that react 
(they have a linear relation between system activation and response) 
and systems that interact. The categorization of interactive systems 
is further elaborated and, as said above, they present conversation 
as the most sophisticated form of interaction (Dubberly, Pangaro 
and Haque, 2009). A similar categorization of passive, reactive and 
interactive systems was presented in (Soler-Adillon, 2012).
3. Designing artistically behaving artifacts
When designing interactive artistic artifacts, the approach to 
interactivity differs from that of designing functional and efficient 
digital systems. In the latter, system’s interfaces should be easy 
to use, robust, consistent with existing standards, etc. and users 
should know what to expect from the system and how to achieve 
their goals. The interactivity of interactive art, on the other hand, 
needs not to be constrained by these principles, as it fundamentally 
differs from functional interaction in its intentions. This dichotomy 
has been characterized, from the point of view of the creator, as 
the ‘design for efficiency’ and ‘design for motivation’ approaches 
to creating interactive media (Ribas, 2001). Along the same lines, 
1.  Jens F. Jensen labeled interactivity as a multi-discursive concept (Jensen, 1998), following Tim O’Sullivan and colleagues’ definition, which states that this kind 
of concepts are, precisely, those the meaning of which changes depending on the context in which they are used (O’Sullivan et al., 1994). 
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Simon Penny has elaborated the notion of poetic interaction, which is 
at the heart of his theorization of the aesthetics of behavior (Penny, 
2000; 2012; 2015). The basic idea is that when designing interactive 
artistic artifacts, the type of interactivity that one is seeking to create 
is very different from the one in the case of functional interaction. 
Poetic interaction is the kind of interactivity that develops within 
a system formed by an interactor and a behaving system that has 
been designed with artistic purposes. The aesthetics of behavior 
refer to the analysis of such type of devices and the experiences 
they afford. 
In respect to functional systems, aesthetically behaving systems 
move towards unpredictability. Systems are neither necessarily easy 
to control in terms of how the interface is presented, nor are they 
necessarily predictable in their behavior. The idea is that they do so 
without falling into what is perceived by the interactor as complete 
random behaviors. Otherwise they become uninteresting in terms 
of interactivity, since when that is the case all sense of dialog or 
control is lost. Thus, artistic interaction is situated in the search for 
a point of equilibrium between what is predictable and what is not. 
According to Simon Penny it “should not be predictably instrumental, 
but should generate behavior which exists in the liminal territory 
between perceived predictability and perceived randomness, a zone 
of surprise, of poetry” (Penny, 2011). And it is in this liminal territory 
that it seeks to create conversation. Moving away from the linear 
responsive model of interaction, as described by Dubberly, Pangaro 
and Haque in (2009), conversation is here a more elaborated mode of 
relation to the artificial system: “artistic interaction [can be conceived] 
as an ongoing conversation between system and user rather than the 
conventional (Pavlovian) stimulus and response model” (Penny, 2000). 
Poetic interaction lives in the realm of art and experimentation. In 
it, interactivity and behavior become aesthetic concerns and this has a 
series of implications in this type of art creation and on the discourses 
around it. In terms of understanding how interactivity is designed 
and understood, this approach is to be interpreted as differentiated 
from functional interaction. The objective of poetic interaction is to 
experiment with the possibilities of interactivity. As noted by Krueger 
when describing his early video tracking experiments, interactivity 
becomes here a central aesthetic concern (Krueger, 1989) and, as 
such, becomes a fundamental part of the artistic interest in these 
pieces, although not necessarily in an exclusive manner. 
The methods of designing artifacts for poetic interaction may 
coincide with those of functional interaction, and some of the design 
principles that apply to the latter apply to the former. However, since 
the objectives are fundamentally different when designing such 
systems, their interpretation has to be made from a different point 
of view. These experiences and the processes that develop as the 
interactor and the system act and react to each other shall be read 
as any other aesthetic experience: a dance between expectations 
and surprise where the interactive artifact seeks to engage the user 
into exploring and experimenting with it; a dance of agency, to use 
Andrew Pickering’s terms (1995). The artistic interactive system is 
not conceived as a tool. Instead of being a system to help a user 
perform a task efficiently, in this paradigm it exists on its own right, 
as an agent – a behaving entity – that will drive the experience of 
the visitor to the piece. 
Thus, creating artistic interactive systems means designing 
performative artifacts that will relate in a meaningful way to an 
interactor. This means that there are mainly two focuses of interest 
in terms of design: interface and behavior. Within the system formed by 
interactor and performative artifact, the first is the point of connection 
between them. In accordance, its design is crucial in establishing 
this relation. The artist creating the artifact knows that the interactor 
relates to his or her environment by doing things with it. According to 
this approach, the idea is that he or she will acquire the necessary 
knowledge to relate to the interactive object through this embodied 
doing, not through an objective abstract examination of it. This means 
that, as opposed to the design of a website from the point of view of 
usability, for instance, the design approach must take into account 
the actions of the interactor at all levels. The analysis of the artifact’s 
behavior comes through the doing things with it in relating to its 
interfaces (using the buttons, moving in front of it, etc.). 
Behavior is the essential element in defining the artifact, and the 
interfaces are the means of establishing the relation to it. All other 
aspects of the piece are accessory to behavior. This doesn’t mean 
they are not important, but external appearance, for instance, is here 
one step below in aesthetic relevance. Indeed, interactive art pieces 
can be analyzed aesthetically from the point of view of appearance 
or in relation to the technology of the time. But according to the 
approach proposed here, it is in terms of performativity, of behavior, 
that are most relevant. Since they aim at relating to their visitors in 
a meaningful way, and are designed to exploit such relations and to 
provoke exploration of behavior on the part of the human interactor, 
they are aesthetically relevant mostly in terms of interactive behavior. 
4. Agency, behavior and performativity
An agent is a behaving entity. Andrew Pickering has described agency 
as a basic building block of the influence that an entity can have on 
its environment. Put simply, agency is about “doing things in the 
world” (Pickering, 2002), a notion that he elaborates in detail in his 
work (Pickering, 1995; 2002; 2010). Other accounts take agency 
further into the ontological and metaphysical, and place it at the very 
center of the configuration of matter and reality. According to Barad, 
agency cannot be an attribute of things as it ontologically precedes 
the things themselves (Barrad, 2007, p. 178). In any case, arguably in 
terms of designing interactivity, it is sufficient to state that an agent 
is a non-passive entity. That is, one that either responds reactively or 
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interactively to the actions that it is able to perceive from whomever 
is relating to it. 
The creation of agents with artistic purposes (agents as artworks) 
has been studied by Simon Penny (2000). An agentic artwork, 
according to Penny, is not just one that does things in responding 
to its surroundings. It can be understood as a cultural actor in its 
own right. These agents are designed and built within a cultural 
tradition, and in a particular social context. And it is when they are 
understood and read as such, and not abstracted from their social 
and technological context, that they can be better understood. 
Penny’s own Petit Mal is a paradigmatic example of this approach. 
This robotic piece intentionally eschews all anthropomorphic or 
zoomorphic appearance, but its behavior is infallibly attributed to 
some sort of animal-like entity, as it hesitantly moves towards and 
away from the visitors in a constant loop of recognition, retreat 
and forgetfulness. The materialization of the piece is crucial, of 
course. Penny acknowledges that it did have the right size so as 
not to be scary, but at the same time not to be regarded as a sort 
of pet robot (Penny, 2015). However, what defines Petit Mal as 
much as its material instantiation is its behavior. Penny’s naming 
it after the disease that informs how it responds to its environment 
is no coincidence here. The defining trait of the piece is its agency; 
one that performatively relates to the visitors in a neat example of 
embodied interaction. 
With these type of pieces, then, the aesthetic focus on interactivity 
is a step away from the object and a step closer towards its relation 
to the interactor. The work is neither just the behaving system nor its 
behavior, but it too encompasses the situated actions of the visitor, 
the embodied ‘contextualized doing’ of whomever interacts with the 
system, much in accordance to the performative ontology that Andrew 
Pickering describes as the basis of Cybernetics. As Simon Penny puts 
it, in connection to ideas of embodied interaction and enaction, “the 
lesson of performativity is that the doing of the action by the subject 
in the context of the work is what constitutes the experience of the 
work. It is less the destination, or chain of destinations, and more the 
temporal process which constitutes the experience” (Penny, 2011). 
As said, an important issue here is with what Pickering has 
identified as the performative ontology of Cybernetics, which 
is arguably extensible to interactive art practices in general. The 
basic idea is that, in opposition to the representational ontology of 
modern science, Cybernetics is based on a performative ontology: “a 
decentered perspective that is concerned with agency – doing things 
in the world – and with the emergent interplay of human and material 
agency” (Pickering, 2002). Within this context, Cybernetics appears as 
a paradigmatic discipline of the ‘performative idiom’. The discipline 
as a whole “is all about this shift from epistemology to ontology, from 
representation to performativity, agency and emergence, not in the 
analysis of science but within the body of science itself” (Pickering, 
1995). 
Thus, the performative idiom, according to Pickering, is an ontology 
in its own right, and a nonmodern one in the sense that it differentiates 
itself from the reductionist approach of the scientific method (the 
modern ontology). In contrast to Bruno Latour’s characterization of 
modernity as being determined by the dualism of people and things 
(Latour, 1993), the cybernetic approach, in which this frontier would 
be blurred, “stages for us a nonmodern ontology, in which people and 
things are not so different at all” (Pickering 2010, p. 18). As he has 
explained (Pickering, 2008; 2010), this ontology allows Cybernetics 
to propose an image of the world that is performative rather than 
representational. He calls it the ‘ontological theater’, a nonmodern 
understanding of the world and our relationship with it that implies 
“a vision of knowledge as ‘part of’ performance rather than as an 
external controller of it” (Pickering 2010, p. 25). 
Here the idea of the black box is useful to understand how 
this is brought into practice. According to Pickering, Cybernetics 
proposes a theory of knowledge that is largely built up through a 
performative relationship with what we can understand as black 
boxes. Rather than being about control in a classical sense, “the 
entire task of Cybernetics was to figure out how to get along in 
a world that was not enframable, that could not be subjugated to 
human designs – how to build machines and construct systems 
that could adapt performatively to whatever happened to come 
their way” (Pickering 2010, pp. 30-31). 
In this context, he argues how Cybernetics assumes in fact an 
ontology that, contrary to the reductionist approach, involves a certain 
degree of unknowability, as it “tries to address the problematic of 
Figure 1. Petit Mal. © Simon Penny.
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getting along performatively with systems that can always surprise 
us” (Pickering 2010, p. 23). These are what Stafford Beer labeled 
as exceedingly complex systems. That is, systems which are, 
unlike simple and merely complex systems, neither predictable nor 
susceptible to be treated by the methods of modern science and 
engineering. Exceedingly complex systems, like the interior of the 
black boxes, are unknowable. They are too complex to be grasped 
representationally, and they change over time, so that future behavior 
cannot be anticipated trough current knowledge. 
So if Cybernetics was about that, as Pickering argues, it was 
not so much about control, as some literature has portrayed it, as it 
was about the study of the conditions under which the interaction 
among different parts of technology could result in these complex, 
unanticipated patterns of behavior. Some of the devices built by the 
cybernetic practitioners were clearly built in order to experiment in this 
direction, and were in this respect anticipative of interactive art. Ross 
Ashby’s Homeostat was a machine whose sole purpose was to exist 
performatively. Once set in motion a homeostat unit would connect 
to others and seek its own equilibrium, with no other goal than that. 
Norbert Wiener defined it as the “brilliant idea of the unpurposeful 
random mechanism which seeks for its own purpose through a 
process of learning” and qualified it as “one of the great philosophical 
contributions of the present day” (Wiener, 1989, p. 38). Grey Walters 
tortoises, which behaved much similarly to the contemporary Roomba 
robots – certainly not by chance –, also represent an example of 
such practices. These avant-la-lettre bottom-up robotic devices were 
capable of surprising its own designer, Walter, who described them 
as having a ‘remarkably unpredictable’ behavior (Walter, 1950). As 
Owen Holland has noted, they were a clear anticipation of Artificial Life 
(Holland, 1997; 2003). These two pieces, along with Gordon Pask’s 
Musicolour and Colloquy of Mobiles, suffice to exemplify the early 
Cybernetic’s remarkable anticipation of interactive art. 
5. Emergence
The element of surprise, of impossibility of a full anticipation that 
Pickering attributes to Cybernetics, and that can be expanded to 
interactive art in general, clearly resonates with the idea of emergence, 
a concept that is often explained with the idea of a whole being ‘more’ 
than just the sum of its parts; of being irreducible to the mere addition 
of its constituting elements. These explanations are usually articulated 
in terms of different levels of complexity where parts or agents are the 
constituents of a larger systemic level (the whole) in which emergent 
phenomena appear. What is emergent are properties and behaviors 
that can be observed at the system level, and they have a degree of 
complexity that, as it is argued, cannot be accounted for by a simple 
addition of the properties and behaviors of the parts. 
In the academic literature the concept of emergence appears 
as related to two different and not necessarily related phenomena: 
self-organization and the appearance of novelty (Soler-Adillon and 
Penny, 2014). Many authors present it as the result of multiple local 
interactions among agents within a system that produce observable 
patterns at the system level. These patterns are emergent phenomena 
in the sense that they could not be understood, nor anticipated, through 
the analysis of the elements and their behaviors in isolation (Langton, 
1988; Holland, 1998; Bedau, 2008). For other authors, emergent 
phenomena are related to fundamental novelty and, thus, to creativity. 
For them, emergence is synonymous to the appearance of new 
functions or behaviors in a known system (Steels, 1995; Cariani, 2012).
The typical examples of emergence are systems that exhibit 
complex behaviors from a relatively small set of simple rules and 
behaviors. Ant or termite colonies and their social complexity, the human 
mind understood as a product of the interconnectivity of neurons in the 
brain, chemical clocks, traffic jams or cellular automata are some of 
the most cited examples. When related to novelty, emergence is often 
used when referring to learning systems or adaptive devices. 
Prominent among the authors that are concerned with emergence 
as a generator of novelty and, thus, as creativity, Peter Cariani has 
elaborated the theory known as emergence-relative-to-a-model (eg 
Cariani 1992; 2009; 2011; 2012). Cariani articulates a discourse 
that aims at identifying emergence as novelty in a given system 
in a way that can be scientifically communicated. His approach is 
concerned with how new functions can appear in systems or devices 
that perceive and act on their environment. The basic idea is that 
this newness can only be accounted for scientifically if, first, the 
observer of the system defines its states and state-transitions by 
creating a model of it. Once this is done, these observations are 
used to make predictions on the futures states of the system. In 
this context, emergence occurs whenever unanticipated behaviors, 
states or functions appear: “emergence is the appearance of novel 
entities that in one sense or another could not have been predicted 
from what came before” (Cariani, 2009). 
Figure 2. Walter’s tortoises. © Bristol Robotics Laboratory.
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Cariani bases his modeling on three aspects: how the system 
reads and acts on its environment (semantics); how it decides how 
to act according to these readings (syntactics); and how it evaluates 
the actions performed according to its goals (pragmatics). All these 
actions are performed according to the basic building blocks of what 
the system can operate with: the primitives, in Cariani’s terminology. 
Within this framework, he identifies two ways in which emergence 
can occur. The first is Combinatoric Emergence, which consists in the 
appearance of new system functions through new combinations of the 
primitives with which the system operates (eg, genetic algorithms). 
The second is Creative Emergence, which is the appearance of new 
functions trough the introduction of new primitives in the computations. 
This second type of emergence, equivalent to the introduction of a new 
sensory organ in an animal species through the course of evolution, 
is extremely rare in artificial systems, and in fact Cariani identifies 
in his literature only one case: Gordon Pask’s electrochemical ‘ear’ 
(Cariani, 1993; 2012). Despite these difficulties in the case of artificial 
systems, however, Cariani opens a door to mixed computer-human 
systems (ie, interactive systems) to be generators of this latter kind 
of emergence (Cariani, 2009; 2012).
The relationship between emergence and interactive art can be 
exemplified by the idea of the unpredictable black box (Soler-Adillon, 
2011). In the prototypical engineering black box, the researcher can 
figure out the mappings between inputs and outputs; i.e. he or she 
must be able to develop a protocol to map what goes in and what 
comes out of the box (Ashby, 1957). In contrast, unpredictable black 
boxes would be devices that appear as black boxes even to their own 
creator; systems in which the relation of inputs and outputs is not 
fully foreseeable, and the inside of which is not only unknown but 
unknowable. Thus, the only possible relation with these unpredictable 
black boxes is the continuous performative act of interacting with 
them. Not even the eventual opening of the box (or zooming in into 
the system) would solve the problem of the unpredictability that they 
would have up to some degree. 
Ideally, the result of the unpredictable black box is not mere 
randomness but something that, although coherent with the general 
behaviors of the system, was not explicitly built in it by its designer – 
something that lives in the liminal territory of poetic interaction and 
can be qualified as emergent. As often happens in interactive art (eg 
in generative art and especially in Artificial Live Art), it is sought by 
the artist to create systems or processes that exceed his or her own 
expectations. The idea is to do so not through some blind trial and 
error, but through the creation of the conditions where emergent 
phenomena can occur. This creative effort can be conceptualized with 
the idea of emergence as generation of novelty (Soler-Adillon, 2015).
In terms of designing interactive artifacts potentially capable 
of exhibiting emergent behavior, Cariani’s emergence-relative-to-
a-model is arguably the most solid framework to approach the 
challenging task. Designing such devices means facing the apparent 
paradox of designing something that is, in principle, impossible to 
be designed. However, designing the possibilities for emergence to 
appear is indeed possible, and it has been the goal of a series of 
practitioners, mostly in relation to Artificial Life Art. 
A successful example of such pieces is Ruairi Glynn’s Performative 
Ecologies (Glynn, 2008), a series of robots that learn how to best 
attract the gaze of the visitors to the installation space by ‘dancing’ 
in front of them. As they perform their moves, they calculate (through 
facial recognition) how much of the attention of a visitor these 
moves are capable of attracting. Then, using genetic algorithms, the 
individual robots will create new dance moves based on those that 
were successful within the group. With this, eventually the robots 
should be capable of attracting more and more of the users’ attention 
as they learn over time to do so. The new behaviors that the robots 
learn and perform, and that were not pre-designed by the artist, can 
be regarded as a case of emergence – particularly, of combinatoric 
emergence according to Cariani’s categorization (Soler-Adillon, 2015). 
Figure 3. Performative ecologies. © Ruairi Glynn.
6. Conclusions
Interactive art is about behaving entities, agents, performatively 
relating to their environment, which includes the interactor (visitor, 
user, etc.). The theorization and practices of early Cybernetics, 
through what Pickering has labeled the performative idiom, can 
be a good theoretical framework to understand how these ideas 
relate to each other. The embodied doing of the interactor with the 
interactive systems, and the connection to ideas of unpredictability 
and emergence offer an interesting arena for the analysis and 
creation of interactive art pieces. According to this, the guidelines 
of design for emergent behavior are possible to produce. Cariani’s 
emergence-relative-to-a-model and the theorization of emergence as 
self-organization and as generation of novelty constitute a theoretical 
framework within which this task can be undertaken. 
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However, any aesthetic discussion on this area requires a sound 
conceptual analysis; a clarification of terms that helps avoid the 
ambiguities of discussing interactivity and emergence without a clear 
statement of what is exactly meant by such multi-discursive concepts. 
In this respect, the proposed definition of interactivity, along with the 
theorization of emergence as self-organization and as generation of 
novelty (Soler-Adillon, 2015) represents an effort to contribute to the 
elaboration of the aesthetics of artistically behaving systems.
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